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Rudolf Hrbek 
It is not the intention of this paper to deal with the process of 
regionalisation - in general or with regard to individual examples, 
particularly in Western Europe - and the specific dynamism which 
normally accompanies such processes. Its focus will be rather on 
political systems with an established federal structure (like the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland and Austria) and on the 
political dynamics inherent in a federal system. The analysis will 
try to demonstrate that a federal structure does imply and also 
generate political dynamics in different respects. The knowledge 
of such experiences might be useful for countries with regionalisat-
ion tendencies and processes, as some of them have obviously been 
prepared to adopt federal structures to a certain extent. Political 
actors in the respective countries which are undergoing such 
developments should be aware of the dynamics implied in estab-
lished federal systems and/or typical for politics within such 
systems. 
The paper does not claim to represent a thorough and 
exhaustive analysis, but is seen as a contribution towards a better 
understanding of the consequences of regionalisation processes 
which lead to the emergence of some sort of federal structure. 
Needless to say, the various political manifestations will be eval-
uated differently: what might be desirable or acceptable for some 
will be criticised and rejected by others. The following paragraphs 
give an idea of the main aspects of political dynamics in political 
systems with a federal structure. 
A federal structure means: 
that there are state units beside and below the state as 
a whole; 
that these state units (Länder in Austria and the FRG, 
cantons in Switzerland) have legislative powers of their 
own to fulfill particular tasks and have financial 
resources at their disposal; 
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that each regional state unit forms a political system 
on its own (it may have its own constitution, its own 
system of government, with institutions such as a 
government a parliament, courts of justice; a political 
infrastructure - with political parties and interest 
associations - of its own; perhaps a sense of state or 
regional identity); 
that the components of a federal system have 
developed a pattern of co-operation: sub-national state 
units amongst each other and with the federation; 
that even the structure of political organisations might 
correspond to the structure of the state: this means the 
existence of a party or pressure group organisation at 
regional level. 
Let us consider briefly the various aspects of political dynamics in 
a federal system. 
Development of Federalism 
The constitution of a country which is a federation normally 
defines the federal structure in principle: for example, the distrib-
ution of powers amongst federal and regional units; the rules and 
procedures of co-operation. Within this framework, however, there 
is dynamism and development; the federal structure is never static. 
The principal source of that dynamism is the struggle for 
predominance between the federation and the regional states. In 
response to the centralisation of political power during the Nazi 
regime, the three Western allies responsible for the re-emergence 
of political life in postwar (Western) Germany decided that the new 
state must have 'a democratic constitution which will establish for 
the participating states a governmental structure of federal type 
which is best adopted to the eventual reestablishment of German 
unity at present disrupted, and which will protect the rights of the 
participating states, provide adequate central authority, and 
contain guarantees of individual rights and freedoms'(l). 
There were conflicting positions within the constituent 
assembly concerning the realisation of a federal structure: the 
Social Democrats were in favour of a relatively powerful central 
authority (as they hoped to win a majority and use this power 
according to their political programme), while the majority of 
Christian Democrats were determined to have strong regional 
states. The solution laid down in the Basic Law was a compromise, 
which did not put an end to the controversy and could not prevent 
political developments from modifying the constitutional solution. 
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Unitary tendencies did strengthen the central authority in Bonn at 
the expense of the Länder(2). From the very beginning, the Länder 
developed a whole pattern of co-operation procedures and frame-
works amongst themselves and with the institutions at national 
level. Amendments to the constitution (in the late 1960s) as well 
as political practice can be interpreted as an adaptation of the 
federal structure to new emerging needs and challenges. After 
more than a decade of the predominance of unitary solutions, 
politicians sought greater autonomy for units at the sub-national 
level. This reaction shows very clearly the dynamism inherent in a 
federal system in general. Recent developments in this direction 
reflect the emergence of special problems at the regional level, or 
rather the perception that there are regional problems which 
require solutions within this framework. 
Separation and Balance of Power 
Federalism has been understood as a device and strategy to avoid 
the centralisation of political power and authority since this might 
lead to dangerous misuse. Montesquieu taught us how necessary it 
was that 'le pouvoir arrete le pouvoir'. He offered the concept of 
separating powers and central institutions as a means of securing 
freedom. A federal structure serves the same goal: a division of 
authority between the federation, on the one hand, and the regional 
state units, on the other, not forgetting the balance amongst the 
regional units themselves. This division can be brought about by 
several rules and mechanisms laid down in the constitution, as the 
West German example shows. 
At first sight the position of the Länder seems to be rather 
weak. Compared to the federation they have only a few reserved 
powers, particularly in cultural affairs including education, in law 
and order and in local government. The federation, on the other 
hand, is much better equipped: according to the Basic Law it has 
the exclusive right to act in certain fields and in the majority of 
cases where legislation has to be exercised 'concurrently' by the 
federation or the Länder, federal legislation takes precedence over 
that of the Länder. 
A first substantial counterweight lies in the administrative 
competence of the Länder; according to Article 83 of the Basic 
Law (The Länder shall execute federal laws as matters of their 
own concern in so far as this Basic Law does not otherwise provide 
or permit') they are given the right and task of implementation. As 
a consequence, the civil service of the federation is relatively 
small compared to the huge personnel capacities the Länder have 
at their disposal. 
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A second counterweight lies in the existence of a second 
chamber (Bundesrat) formed by the Länder governments. This 
institution, which is located at federal level, is a vehicle for the 
Länder to introduce their concerns into federal legislation. Via the 
Bundesrat the Länder are represented at federal level, and can 
exploit their administrative strength to get their interests consid-
ered. It is in those fields which affect concerns of the Länder 
directly - particularly legislation with financial implications for 
the Länder - that the majority consent of the Bundesrat is 
obligatory. But even in other cases - where the specific assent of 
the Bundesrat is not required - it has a considerable influence: it 
can raise objections which can be overcome only by a similar 
majority in the Bundestag. And the procedure aiming at reconcil-
iation and compromise for which a special joint committee of the 
two houses has been established Vermittlungsausschuss) offers 
additional possibilities for the Länder to promote their particular 
interests. 
One can easily imagine the political dynamics which stem 
from this construction, especially if one thinks of the party 
political compositions of the Länder governments, the federal 
government, the Bundestag and the Bundesrat. As these composit-
ions never follow the same pattern, politics in the federal frame-
work is characterised by competition, sometimes by controversy 
and confrontation, and eventually by bargaining. Neither element 
can force its will upon the other, rather the component units are 
forced into a scheme of co-operation. 
The Swiss confederation shows a similar pattern. The 
cantons not only have reserved powers in certain fields but also 
substantial powers of taxation so that they can set their own 
priorities in policy making. Via the Ständerat, the second chamber 
in the Swiss system of government, they participate in federal 
legislation. The explicit assent of the Stände rat is mandatory for 
all legislation; it happens very often that the Ständerat and the 
Nationalrat (the first chamber) have to deal with certain issues 
again and again before they reach agreement. Furthermore, the 
cantons play an important role in the preparatory stage of legislat-
ion: they have a considerable say in the so-called 'Vernehmlas-
sungsverfahren', a special form of comprehensive 'hearing' where 
opinions are collected before a bill is formally introduced in the 
chambers. Even more than in the West German case, the Swiss 
construction should be seen less as a source of confrontation but 
rather as a framework for co-operative behaviour. Much of the 
political dynamic in the confederation of Switzerland is determined 
by its federal structure. 
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Political Participation of Citizens 
In a country with a unitary constitution all sovereignty rests with 
the central government which takes nearly all decisions affecting 
the living conditions of the people. The central institutions are 
located in the capital and this is the focus for politics and decision-
making. In the perception of the citizens, politics under such 
circumstances is regarded as a matter which takes place far away 
from them. The distance between the capital and the periphery is 
great, with a tendency to grow - at least in the citizens' percept-
ion. The feeling of being excluded from the political arena can 
emerge and grow and political apathy can be a consequence. In 
some cases regionalisation tendencies have to be understood as a 
reaction or even a protest against this domination from the capital, 
especially if those affected by political decisions taken there have 
(subjective) reasons to complain that their (legitimate) concerns 
are being neglected. Such a deficiency in the democratic quality 
of a political system may have very negative effects in so far as 
the legitimacy of dec is ion-making is being questioned. 
A federal system, on the other hand, offers an additional 
level of decision-making. As described above, the West German 
Länder (and the same would be true for the Länder in Austria) and 
the cantons in Switzerland form - at the sub-national level -
political systems of their own. The German Länder, for example, 
'have the full panoply of governments in miniature. They are 
headed by a minister-president, they have their own constitutions 
and constitutional courts, administrative systems and civil service, 
and they all follow the pattern of parliamentary government 
responsible to an elected assembly'(3). We may add that the 
political system at the sub-national level is completed by a 
political infrastructure formed especially by parties and pressure 
groups organised at Land or canton level. 
The political arena of a Land or a canton is much nearer to 
the individual citizen than the remote capital with its central 
institutions and political organisations. It offers the citizen 
additional possibilities for political participation. Constituencies 
are smaller, and there is a better chance to get in touch with 
politicians active at the regional level. The issues on the agenda of 
Land or canton politics affect the citizen more directly, he may 
well understand better what is at stake, and have easier access to 
information. Party or pressure group organisations offer him 
platforms for activity. 
Such provisions do not automatically lead to intense political 
engagement on the part of citizens; they are not a guarantee, but 
they give a better chance of active participation. If citizens 
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exploit these possibilities the democratic quality of the whole 
political system will improve, or rather the system will gradually 
gain this quality. 
One can argue that political engagement at the sub-national 
(including the local) level has very often adopted the form and 
character of protest which endangers political stability, and that 
therefore a federal structure brings with it disadvantages and may 
create severe problems which otherwise could have been avoided. 
This argument overlooks the fact that the source of dissatisfaction 
and unrest is not the existence of a political system at the sub-
national level but rather the deficiencies of central decisions, or 
the fact of 'non-decisions'. 
Effects on Parties and the Party System 
We have already mentioned that the federal structure in the 
organisation of the state units is often accompanied by correspond-
ing structures for parties (and pressure groups): there is an 
organisational level between the basic party units at the local level 
and the central party institutions at national level which strictly 
follows the frontiers between state units at the sub-national level. 
The establishment of party organisations within individual 
Länder or cantons has to be seen against the background of their 
parliamentary system. The regional party organisation will follow 
the general political guidelines for the party as a whole, but in 
order to be successful in the particular Land or canton it might 
tend to achieve a special political profile with regard to regional 
traditions, the specific political culture and the economic and 
social situation in the region. Within a regional party organisation 
political positions and tendencies might gain prominence which 
represent only a small minority within the national organisation. 
Party wings can have strongholds in different regions. This can be 
seen in the case of the West German Social Democratic Party: 
some regional party units were labelled as explicitly left-wing in 
comparison with the party's main stream which was characterised 
by a reformist strategy. 
Minorities in a political party have better opportunities to 
articulate their position within such an organisational structure. 
Elective offices and positions in the central institutions are distrib-
uted according to the relative strengths of the regional party units. 
The variety within a party, even in its regional dimension, is 
reflected in the composition of the central bodies. This contrib-
utes to intra-party democracy. A regional party organisation can 
be regarded as a factor balancing other regional party units. Under 
such circumstances even the individual party member (comparable 
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to the citizen) has better opportunities for active and efficient 
engagement in his organisation and this also contributes to intra-
party democracy. 
Much political dynamism can stem from the parties' abilities 
to vary slightly in political performance and behaviour from one 
Land to another. If the party system is characterised by competit-
ion and the need to form coalitions, the party leadership at the 
national level might decide to test a new coalition first at the 
regional level. There, party organisation would modify its position 
and offer a compromise in an area which is given high priority by 
the prospective new partner. Reactions in opinion polls or - much 
more reliable - in elections for the regional parliament will show 
the participating parties whether they can afford to continue their 
move and whether a new coalition pattern at the regional level 
might be regarded as the model for activities and developments at 
the national level. The risks attached to such reorientation are 
much smaller when restricted to one regional state than if the 
parties initiate it at the national level. 
Party behaviour in the FRG can serve as an illustration for 
such strategies. In the mid-1950s the Liberals in Nordrhein-
Westfalen abandoned the coalition with the Christian Democrats 
and supported the Social Democrats who were then able to take 
over government responsibility; the Liberals intended this dramatic 
step as a signal to Bonn but it failed, as the majority of the 
electorate supported Adenauer in 1957. In 1969 the Liberals voted 
in favour of the Social Democratic candidate for the Federal 
Presidency, which was intended as a move indicating the possibility 
of a new coalition to replace the Grand Coalition after the federal 
elections in the autumn of 1969. Similarly, the decision of the SPD 
in Hessen in 1984 to accept the parliamentary support of the 
Greens has been interpreted as a first approach towards a totally 
new political coalition pattern: a red-green alliance. There is, and 
will be, much discussion and controversy about these moves; 
developments at the Land level generate a political dynamic 
throughout the whole Republic. 
The federal structure may well have an impact on the 
development of the party system in yet another respect. A smaller 
party which presents itself as a new political actor may start its 
activities within the framework of one regional state. As a 
newcomer such a party lacks organisational and financial strength, 
so that it may be more promising to start in a limited context and, 
if successful, extend its activities from this basis. A break-through 
in national elections would mean 'ratification' of previous successes 
at the regional level. This was the case with the National 
Democratic Party, a right-wing political force, which was able to 
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enter a small minority of West German Länder parliaments in the 
late 1960s. The attempt to have this success 'ratified' in the 
federal elections in 1969 failed; the NPD won only 4.3 per cent of 
the vote, and suffered an abrupt decline: thereafter it disappeared 
from Länder parliaments and now has less than one per cent of the 
national vote. 
The development of the Greens, on the other hand, was much 
more successful. They also started at the Land level and managed 
to replace the Liberals here and there as the 'third force' in the 
party spectrum; finally, in 1983, they entered the Bundestag and 
seem to have established themselves as a permanent political 
factor. In both cases, the activity of new political forces under the 
special conditions of a federal system produced a great deal of 
political dynamism. 
The existence of a party which restricts its organisation to 
one region - like the CSU in Bavaria - is a special case of a party 
system made possible under a federal regime. With its stronghold 
in Bavaria, the CSU influences politics at the national level very 
efficiently. Political observers agree that the party of Franz Josef 
Strauss contributes a great deal to the party political dynamics of 
the FRG. 
Elections to Parliamentary Assemblies at the Sub-national Level 
In countries with parliamentary government elections are import-
ant events: the political parties engage themselves intensely in 
order to mobilise and attract the electorate; the voters pay more 
attention than usual to political affairs; the election result may 
cause modifications of governmental policies or lead to a change of 
government from one party (or coalition) to another. In federal 
systems elections take place rather frequently if the sub-national 
state units possess parliamentary assemblies and follow the pattern 
of parliamentary government, as is the case in the FRG and in 
Austria. It is particularly from the example of the FRG that we 
can learn how elections at the level of a single Land can have 
consequences far beyond this regional unit. With the exception of 
the Grand Coalition, Christian Democrats and Social Democrats 
have always been in competition at the federal level. As the 
Bundesrat plays an important role in federal legislation, both 
parties are eager to control the second chamber. As Gordon Smith 
has said, 'Since control over a Land government is immediately 
reflected in the distribution of seats in the Bundesrat, a straight 
line connects an election in even the smallest of the Länder with 
the balance of power at federal level'(4). The SPD as the 
opposition party at the federal level in the 1950s hoped to curb 
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Adenauer's course (for example, over the rearmament issue) by 
winning Länder elections and controlling the respective govern-
ments, including their voting behaviour in the Bundesrat. The 
Christian Democrat opposition against the SPD/FDP coalition was 
a minority in the Bundestag but dominated the Bundesrat, and 
today Brandt´s party, in the three elections held in the spring of 
1985, replaced its Christian Democrat opponent in Saarbrücken 
(though not in Berlin) and kept power in Düsseldorf. Under such 
circumstances each Land election is not only a test for the federal 
government and the Bonn opposition as well, but also a challenge 
and a chance to bring about some shift in the majority pattern of 
the Bundesrat. 
As regards the character of Land elections as political 
testing-grounds, their results send direct messages to the political 
actors in Bonn. Observers speak of an 'electoral cycle': the federal 
government parties normally lose in such mid-term elections, 
whereas the federal opposition can win. As the turn-out is lower in 
Land elections (ranging from 72 per cent to 90 per cent in the 
1980s) than in federal elections (about 90 per cent), losses in the 
mid-term elections do not necessarily signify a decisive defeat of 
the government parties in the Bundestag elections. Land elections 
are, however, some sort of an early-warning system and it is 
because of this that political parties and the public pay remarkable 
attention to them. Structural changes in the electorate's political 
orientation and preference are announced and reflected in these 
elections. 
In Switzerland elections in the cantons are less important in 
this respect for two reasons: there is no system of alternative 
parliamentary government, and the frequent use of referenda 
overshadows elections to parliamentary assemblies as far as their 
general importance is concerned. 
Pressure-group Structure and Activities 
As was pointed out in the case of political parties, the federal 
structure of the state is repeated in the organisational structure of 
pressure groups. They have organisational units at the regional 
level, as can be seen in our three examples, and this enables them 
to interact in a highly differentiated way with the state bureau-
cracy at the regional level. They can therefore avoid integrating 
or even forcing the interests of their members into a comprehen-
sive and consistent strategy, irrespective of regional differences 
which do in fact exist in several sectors. 
Pressure groups with two tracks at their disposal can thus 
improve their efficiency. The national leadership can deal at the 
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relevant level with more general questions, whereas the regional 
organisation is the bargaining partner which takes into account 
special concerns at the regional level. Only in the case of manifest 
conflicts between regional organisations representing the same 
pressure group and sector will their efficiency be affected 
negatively or even reduced. Intra-organisational democracy can 
only gain from the greater variety and more complex structure. 
Elite Recruitment and Circulation 
In a federal system regional states constitute an additional frame-
work for political careers besides that at local and at national 
level. We can identify a number of careers which end up with a 
position in the regional state following a preparatory stage as 
office-holder or functionary at the local level. The regional state 
offers career opportunities for the emergence of a regional elite 
whose members help to create a sense of regional identity. 
Experience shows that individual members of the regional 
elite holding elective or party office move on to the national level. 
Federal Chancellors in the FRG have held high-ranking positions at 
Land level: when Kiesinger was elected in 1966 he left the office 
of Prime Minister in Baden-Württemberg; Brandt had been Lord 
Mayor in Berlin and Kohl Prime Minister in Rheinland-Pfalz. There 
have been, and still are, prime ministers in individual Länder who 
are said to have ambitions for a top position in Bonn. Their 
performance is, therefore, observed very carefully within their 
party and by the public, as it may serve as the qualification for 
higher functions. 
It is not only top-ranking politicians who change from the 
Länder to Bonn. Among the staff in the federal ministries there 
are many civil servants who started their career in the adminis-
tration of a Land government. 
The exchange does not take place only in one direction. 
There are outstanding examples of politicians who leave the 
federal level in order to take over office in a Land (for example, 
four former Social Democratic federal ministers: Vogel and Apel in 
Berlin, Dohnanyi in Hamburg, Ravens in Lower-Saxony). 
The following reasons can explain the different forms of elite 
exchange: 
a prime minister in a West German Land might have the 
image of being a very capable and at the same time 
popular politician; both qualities will help him to 
attract voters when the office of Federal Chancellor is 
at stake. Compared to other candidates who belong to 
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the Bonn elite for a long time, he is not exhausted or 
worn out from the political 'atmosphere' in the capital 
and this may constitute a further asset, 
a former federal minister might have the image of a 
political strong man who will be able to tame and 
dominate his party if it is in a disastrous state, and at 
the same time attract the electorate. 
The Power of the Bureaucracy and the Decline of Parliamentary 
Influence 
A federal system may under certain conditions increase the power 
of the executive and of state bureaucracies in particular. This will 
be the case when the interdependence of the different levels -
federal and regional - grows in intensity and its management 
becomes more and more complicated. Bureaucrats with their 
experience and skills are much better equipped to perform this 
function successfully than politicians. 
An increase in public demand means an increase in the 
responsibilities of the executive. Comprehensive planning and 
attempts to co-ordinate measures and policies in different sectors 
and at different levels of the state organisation strengthen the 
administrations. This development is accompanied bv a decline in 
parliamentary influence. 
The federal system in the FRG has adopted a structure which 
has been labelled as 'co-operative' or 'executive' federalism. These 
terms refer to the fact that it is the executive which increasingly 
manages the whole of relations between the federation and the 
Länder and amongst the Länder themselves. Observers agree that 
this development has been at the expense of the parliamentary 
component in the decision-making system. 
Bargaining about common planning and policy decisions is 
increasingly being carried out by bureaucracies which often adopt 
an independence from the politically responsible governmental 
leadership. The discretion of parliamentary assemblies (Bundestag 
and Länder parliaments) has been reduced to near zero; they only 
ratify what the bureaucrats have prepared and what is often a 
package deal bringing together different interests. Parliamentary 
majorities cannot be expected to vote against what their govern-
ments have prepared and present for formal ratification. But one 
should be aware of the significance of all this for the legitimacy of 
decision-making. 
Nor should one be surprised to find severe criticism of the 
system of parliamentary representation. The representatives are 
accused of ignoring the 'real' interests of those they claim to 
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represent, of using power which is too remote from those affected 
by their decisions and therefore of lacking legitimacy. As the 
criticism is directed against unitary solutions in so far as the 
system of representation is seen as leading to a high degree of 
centralisation, it is linked with demands for decentralisation, for 
greater powers for the basic units, for 'real' democracy which 
cannot be representative in character but should be direct. 
Political Innovation and Policy Decisions 
The impact of federal systems on policy decisions reveals an 
ambiguous picture. One might attribute to political systems with a 
federal structure specific capabilities to induce innovation, and 
instead one finds the argument that they are characterised by an 
immobilisme which prevents any promising and convincing reform 
policies. 
As regards the first argument, it is based on the assumption 
that smaller regional units Länder or cantons - are flexible enough 
to start initiatives in different policy fields. They probably will try 
to do so, if they are given the power of legislation in these areas. 
And they may take initiatives aimed at federal legislation either 
formally or via informal channels. In the first case, their ability to 
produce innovations is dependent on their financial situation: most 
reform bills need financing. Therefore in all federal systems the 
participating units are in a permanent process of bargaining to 
improve their financial basis and enlarge their financial share. 
To take the FRG as an example, policy decisions within the 
framework of one Land might sometimes claim to be a model 
which could or should be followed by other Länder. If, however, 
crucial issues are at stake, solutions within only one individual 
Land might cause intense political controversy, mostly along party 
lines. An example would be decisions taken by one Land govern-
ment concerning the treatment of migrant workers or on environ-
mental questions. 
As regards the second argument - federal systems being 
rather static and hesitant to take decisions in different policy 
fields - we can, first, refer to the frequency of elections 
mentioned above. Experience shows that politicians refrain from 
taking decisions before elections if they fear that these might be 
unpopular and bring disadvantage to the party. As a result of such 
attitudes, issues which need solutions are adjourned, and problems 
remain unsolved. 
The main argument in this respect, however, is that a federal 
structure needs co-operation between all the participant units, as 
was explained above. But not only co-operation: there is also 
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pressure to find consensus. The mutual dependence of regional 
units and the federation has caused mixed institutions and patterns 
of co-operative behaviour to emerge, with the result that only 
compromise decisions can be taken when the participants can find 
a common denominator. 
One should be cautious, however, about condemning too 
quickly such a pattern of behaviour and decision-making. What is 
immobilisme for one person is steadiness for another; the latter 
warns about the risks to stability, he wants policy decisions to be 
prepared very carefully and to avoid undue haste. The evaluation 
of this pattern of policy-making is highly dependent on one's 
political outlook and position. 
Political Culture: Concordance System 
Throughout this paper one characteristic feature of modern federal 
systems has been mentioned again and again: the close interde-
pendence of the participating units, combined with the eventual 
need for co-operation and compromise in spite of the determined 
political competition in a multi-party system. A federal structure, 
therefore, contributes significantly to the emergence of a partic-
ular political culture: that of a concordance system. Bargaining 
and compromise are the dominant patterns of political behaviour in 
this system, since the different levels and actors are linked with 
each other in various respects and are interdependent. 
Switzerland can be regarded as the classic example of a 
concordance system. It is not only the federal structure that gives 
the Swiss political system this character, but it contributes greatly 
to maintaining concordance as the guiding principle for decision-
making and political behaviour. Austria, without a multi-ethnic 
society and without language and religious cleavages, is another 
example. Its way of solving problems follows the pattern of the 
concordance system. Again, Austria's federal structure helps to 
support and maintain the system. As regards the FRG, the federal 
structure has to be seen as the main factor bringing about a 
political culture which follows the concordance pattern. 
In all three cases, concordance is an overall principle which 
gives the respective political systems their particular quality and 
identity. As such, concordance can be found not only in the 
framework of the federal structure but also in other dimensions of 
the political system, especially in the behaviour of political organ-
isations. There are close mutual links between these dimensions. 
As far as the three examples treated in this paper are 
concerned, it seems as if most participants in the respective 
political arenas - and most observers as well - are not only 
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accustomed to the norms of a concordance system, but also 
appreciate it because they find it difficult to see a viable alter-
native. A concordance system may have its weaknesses and 
deficiencies, but if we look at its results one may well doubt that 
an alternative would be superior (and its democratic quality is also 
very substantial, as was explained above). 
Notes 
(1) Document of Frankfurt of 1 July 1948, on the convention of a 
constituent assembly to establish a West German state. 
(2) The title of Konrad Hesse's book (Der unitarische Bundes-
staat, Karlsruhe, 1962) is typical of the interpretation of such 
trends. 
(3) Gordon Smith, Democracy in Western Germany. Parties and 
Politics in the Federal Republic, Heinemann Educational 
Books, London, 1979, p. 50. 
(4) Ibid., p.157. 
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